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Abstract 
This piece reconstructs and reflects upon the terms of the theoretical projection 
underlying Max Tomba’s book, Marx’s Temporalities, with particular reference to his 
use of the concepts of multiple temporalities (Enst Bloch) and temporal layers (Bloch 
and Reinhart Koselleck). Tomba’s use of these concepts, it is argued, productively 
relocates Marx’s writings within the framework of the 20th-century philosophy of 
time. However, Tomba’s dependence upon received versions of these concepts, 
untransformed, reproduces theoretical problems implicit within them, which have 
been intensified by recent developments within global capital. The application of 
these concepts to an understanding of the historical present, understood as a situation 
of globally disjunctive contemporaranity, is seen to be, in part, vitiated by their 
embeddness within an increasingly exhausted past. 
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Marx’s Temporalities is a book that opens a new horizon of expectation with its title 
alone. This is not just ‘Time in Marx’,1 but Marx’s temporalities – qualitative, plural 
and experiential, as well as ‘objective’ or imposed: ‘temporalities of labour’, 
‘temporalities of capital’ and ‘historical counter-temporalities of the class struggle’, to 
name the three main sets at stake in this work.2 With the phrase ‘Marx’s 
temporalities’, Tomba not only locates Marx’s writings within the ambit of the 
philosophy of time, he places their interpretation firmly within the field of its 
twentieth-century developments, and post-Heideggerian thought about time in 
particular (although it is not clear that the latter is self-consciously so, since there is 
	   2	  
no reference to Heidegger).3 The idea that ‘Capital is a treatise on time, not only on 
stolen time, but also on its transformation and ontologisation’4 opens up an 
interpretative horizon that is explored here primarily in the wake of the writings of 
Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin and Reinhardt Koselleck. (The Bergsonian moment in 
Lukàcs’s History and Class Consciousness, so important for Bloch and Benjamin 
alike, is absent.)  
 The first two of these three figures were anti-Heideggerian Marxists, who sought 
to occupy the space opened up by the early Heidegger’s existentialism on quite 
different philosophical and political terms (in part, provided by Christian and mystical 
Jewish messianism, respectively); the third, is a politically ambivalent (at best) 
student of Heidegger and Gadamer, who transformed the hermeneutical side of their 
ontology into a novel brand of historical semantics, as the methodological basis for a 
new kind of conceptual history. Bloch’s multiversum, conceiving of differences 
between historical temporalities as ‘a polyphony of a unity’; Benjmain’s novum 
exploding in the clash between different times; Koselleck’s generalization of Bloch’s 
idea of multiple layers of time (Zeitschichten) – these are the sources that come 
together in Tomba’s book to structure readings of Marx that aim to think ‘temporal 
diversities’ politically. The world market is a mechanism for synchronising 
temporalities, Tomba argues, so the problem becomes how ‘to think the temporalities 
that are asynchronic in relation to the process of synchronization’.5 This is an 
extremely productive formulation. However, the way in which Tomba responds to it 
is, ironically, overshadowed by what Bloch called the (arguably) ‘genuine’ pastness 
of certain of the theoretical elements upon which he draws. 
 In approaching Marx’s writings, and Capital in particular, in this way, Tomba’s 
book points beyond the more straightforward combinations of philological and 
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categorial analysis characteristic of the recent revival of Marx Studies in Historical 
Materialism, to suggest a thoroughly ‘temporalized’ Marx, directly relevant to the 
politics of global capitalism and – one would have thought, although once again the 
theme is oddly absent – crisis, today. At the level of theory, however, Tomba’s book 
remains primarily only suggestive. The details of the readings are precise, 
illuminating and often provocative: in emphasising the theoretical break represented 
by the manuscripts of 1861–3, in relation to the Grundrisse, for example; and the 
importance of Marx’s engagement with the Russian populists and his ethnographical 
notebooks – all ‘late’ writings. But there is no theoretical construction, or even 
reconstruction, sensu stricto here. Formally, the book’s three chapters and two 
appendices function as a constellation of five essays, each focused on a different body 
of Marx’s texts. To get to the more enduring heart of the contribution of Marx’s 
Temporalities, therefore, one must reconstruct for oneself the terms of its underlying 
theoretical projection, in order to draw out its implications, possibilities and 
limitations.  
 There are two main issues at stake: first, the theorisation of the multiplicity of 
social temporalities within contemporary capitalism, via the appropriation of the idea 
of a ‘multi-layered temporal dialectic’ to be found in the writings of Bloch and 
Koselleck; and second, the articulation of the unity of these temporalities through the 
concept of synchronization, with respect to (i) the world market and (ii) the 
experience of divergent or conflicting temporalities as the ‘political occasion of an 
intervention’.6  
 We must start, therefore, elsewhere than Tomba himself: with a consideration of 
Bloch’s famous concept of ‘non-sametimeliness’ (Ungleichzeitigkeit) and the 
‘obligation to its dialectic’ set out in the ‘Summary Transition’ of that name (‘Non-
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sametimeliness and the Obligation to its Dialectic’), dated May 1932, in his 1935 
Erbschaft dieser Zeit – Inheritance of This Time. ‘Non-sametimeliness’ (as I shall 
translate Ungleichzeitigkeit, in an awkwardly literal manner, for reasons that will 
become apparent shortly) is Bloch’s register of the paradoxical multiplicity of 
historical temporalities within a common present, construed according to an orthodox 
materialist conception of historical forms, calibrated by a series of modes of 
production and their constitutive class relations. It derives from Marx’s own idea of 
‘unequal development’. This idea is combined uncertainly by Tomba with that of a 
‘plurality’ of capitalistic social times, of which the main ones are those ‘temporalities 
of capital’ that Tomba derives from Tombazos’s commentary on ‘categories of time 
in Marx’s Capital’.7 I say ‘uncertainly’, since the ‘temporalities of capital’ in the title 
of chapter 3 remain unreflected with the ‘layered historiography’ in its appendix, on 
Marx’s chapter on ‘so-called primitive accumulation’. The theoretical problem raised 
by the book lies in the gap between these two carefully paired essays – in much the 
same way that Etienne Balibar has suggested that the ‘fecundity’ of Althusser’s 
‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ essay derives from the ‘suspension of the argument in 
the vicinity of the decisive articulation’ between ‘two fundamentally discontinuous 
series of arguments’.8 There is a kind of formal sleight of hand whereby, being placed 
next to each other, the two series appear to enter into a relation, despite the fact there 
no theoretical development actually occurs mediating the two. The prospect of an 
integral theoretical position is thus gestured towards, but remains frustratingly out of 
view. 
 
Learning from fascism 
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Bloch’s ‘Summary Transition’ is the fifty-page middle section of the central part of 
Inheritance of This Time, on ‘Non-sametimeliness and Intoxication’ (Berauschung). It 
thus stands at the very centre of the book, indeed, is its ‘orientating centre’, in 
Bloch’s words from his 1934 Preface. Most relevant here is what by the 1962 edition 
had become the third of five parts of this ‘orientating centre’, ‘Nonsametimeliness and 
Sametimeliness, Philosophically’ (Ungleichzeitigkeit und Gleichzeitigkeit, 
philosophisch): a fifteen-page passage at the centre of the orientating centre that 
concludes with a section entitled ‘Problem of a Multi-Layered Dialectic’. This 
problem is both outlined and also finds the schema of its solution there, in a Leninist 
account of ‘proletarian hegemony’, which takes as its slogan: 
no proletarian hegemony… without thoroughly ‘mastering’ the substance of 
genuine non-sametimeliness (Ungleichzeitigkeit) and its heterogeneous 
contradictions.9 
 This is the political moral of the early Bloch’s writing on time, of which Tomba’s 
book may be read as an insistent reminder. However, not only is this condition of 
proletarian hegemony a negative (and hence insufficient one) one – ‘no proletarian 
hegemony without…’ – but it was already in 1935 historically belated as political 
advice. It was directed at the conditions under which the book was composed (the rise 
of fascism in Germany in the early 1930s), as a prospective reversal of those 
conditions, through a Left appropriation of the temporal strategy that had brought 
them about: a ‘learning from fascism’, not unlike the ‘Learning from Thatcherism’ 
that Stuart Hall would subsequently propose in the 1980s.10 Or more precisely, as 
Frederic Schwartz puts it in his wonderful article, ‘Ernst Bloch and Wilhelm Pinder: 
Out of Synch’ (from which I have stolen my title), the idea was to counter the ‘brown 
theft’ of communist rhetoric by fascism, with the ‘red theft’ of fascism’s political 
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exploitation of ‘non-sametimely’ social elements and cultural strata.11 Yet, by 1935, 
even if such a project made theoretical sense (as the temporalized basis of a Popular 
Front), in Germany it was already too late. The significance of Bloch’s intervention 
thus became that of a general theoretical lesson, equally applicable elsewhere (to the 
historical conditions in the Soviet Union at the time, for example, although that could 
not be said) – indeed, anywhere else, insofar as the analysis can justify its claim to 
being a specifically ‘philosophical’ one; that is, can justify the assumption that such a 
formal reversal of the political polarity of such a temporal strategy makes enduring 
historical – rather than merely short-term, tactical – sense. 
 This is a fundamental problem in the philosophy of historical temporalizations. It 
raises the issue: just how applicable is Bloch’s analysis today? Is it especially 
applicable, in the radically interconnected and evermore developmentally ‘unequal’ 
world of global capital, as Tomba implicitly suggests? Or are there limits derived 
from the historical context of its formulation?  And, to the extent that it is not 
applicable, what does this tell us about the temporalities of history today; and the 
forms of politics they render possible?12 This is the context of problems into which 
Tomba’s reading of Marx is pitched by its appropriation of Bloch’s concept of 
temporal layers. They are exaccerbated by the mediation of this reception via 
Koselleck, since it is not clear that the generalized Koselleckian framework is 
compatible with Tomba’s emabrace of Bloch’s broadly Leninist temporal-political 
project (hegemony). One set of clues to the theoretical complexity of this context lies 
in the multiple English translations of Bloch’s central conceptual opposition of 
Gleichzeitigkeit and Ungleichzeitigkeit. 
 To date there have been three equally problematic alternatives: (1) 
‘synchronicity/non-synchronicity’, (2) ‘simultaneity/non-simultaneity’ and (3) – the 
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truly sympotomatic one, used by Neville and Steven Plaice, in the 1991 Polity edition, 
Heritage of Our Times – ‘contemporaneity/non-contemporaneity’.13 These are not 
merely alternative possible translations of Bloch’s terms, but conceptually radically 
different proposals, which overdetermine the philosophical meaning of Bloch’s text in 
relation to subsequent theoretical and historical contexts, in different ways. In brief, 
(1) as a strictly structural temporality (this is Tomba’s choice in his displacement of 
the idea onto the plurality of temporalities of capital), (2) naturalistically, according to 
the structure of physical or ‘cosmological’ time; and (3) in accord with the more 
complex cultural and now-historical temporality of the living actuality of the present, 
characterized by conjunction and disjunction (disjunctive synthesis), which entered 
critical debates only in the last three decades (‘after 1989’).14 The awkwardly literal 
‘sametimeness’, on the other hand, (my stubborn fourth option) evokes Kierkegaard’s 
Danish samtidiged, philosophical source of the existential idea of the act of bringing 
together different times to produce a ‘same time’. It is this Kierkegaardian 
‘sametimeness’, I have argued elsewhere, that first exhibits at the level of the 
individual, the structure of ‘contemporaneity’ subsequently to emerge, over one 
hundred years later, as a genuinely historical form.15 Critically, it is this notion of an 
active production of sametimessness (to each act its own production of time) that 
raises serious questions about the essentially reactive character of Tomba’s notion of 
multi-temporality as the mere ‘occasion’ of political intervention. Bloch’s Leninism 
appears here, in Tomba, in late or post-Althusserian, occasionalist guise: 
‘conjuncture’ is coded in aleatory fashion as ‘occasion’.16 
 Significantly, the ‘simultaneity’ and ‘synchronicity’ translation options have their 
own literal equivalents in German (Simultaneität and Synchronität), while translating 
back in this directiom, ‘contemporaneity’ has no satisfactory German equivalent17 – 
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the closest probably being the awkward neologism, Zeitgenossenschaflichkeit. 
Gleichzeitigkeit itself, and a gloss on ‘presentness’, Farbigkeit auch etwas 
Gegenwärtiges (could one say Gegenwärtigkeit?), are currently the most commonly 
used ways to translate ‘contemporaneity’ into German. However, along with 
Zeitgenossenschaflichkeit, both etymologically and in their historical-semantics, they 
fail to convey what is most central to the notion: namely, a sense of the distinctive 
temporality of the ‘with’ (con-), of a coming together of multiple and hence different 
times. To understand the deeper conceptual meaning and political possibilities of 
Bloch’s Ungleichzeitigkeit one must thus read it from the standpoint of Kierkegaard’s 
samtidiged, as the mark of historically different but coeval temporalities that can be 
brought together in different ways within the present: through the ‘mastering’ of their 
‘heterogeneous contradictions’.18 
 The historically differential temporal multiplicity of non-sametimeness (what 
Bloch called an ‘infinitely many-voiced’ past)19 is the issue at the forefront of the 
conceptual structure of ‘contemporaneity’ today, in its relations to the ‘plurality’ of 
temporalities of capital. The latter appear, from a Blochian standpoint, on a 
historically common temporal plane. Yet capital appears to us, today, as itself 
historically differential. What appears in the Plaices’ translation as ‘non-
contemporaneity’ is thus, ironically, the precise structure of contemporaneity itself 
today. A wide variety of commentators have recognised Bloch as the precursor of 
current debates about historical temporality. What has gone unrecognised is that he is 
so in an inverted form: Bloch’s ‘non-sametimeliness’ is the very structure of the 
‘sametimeliness’ produced by capital today. Synchronization by global markets 
produces not just social homogenization but also the differentiation of historically 
specific localities, which find themselves related to one another for the first time. As 
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Appaduri has argued: today, locality is the product of global relations (Appaduri, 
2013).  
 This inversion registers an element of what Bloch himself called ‘genuine 
pastness’ in Bloch’s own text: namely, its internalization of the plural temporalities of 
capital itself to a single historical plane. 
 In Tomba’s book, there is no sense of this inversion of terms imposed on Bloch’s 
text by the recent global history of capitalism, or of there being any ‘genuinely’ 
passed or ‘exhausted’ elements within it. Tomba appears driven by the political 
imaginary of a post-Trotskyist revival of Bloch’s Leninism (‘no proletarian hegemony 
without…’) rather than by the new theoretical and political possibilities opened up by 
a historical judgment on the limitations of Bloch’s text. Yet in Tomba’s own account, 
the articulating moment of unity, posited by Bloch as ‘hegemony’, appears only 
structurally, as the product of the syncronization of the world market.  As a result, 
politics is displaced from hegemonic articulation onto political reactions to 
‘occasional’ contradictions between synchronized and non-synchronized social 
elements. 
 Theoretically, the limitations of Bloch’s book are to be found in the very same 
place that its current admirers locate its timeliness: namely, in its geological 
imaginary of temporal layering, which confines temporal multiplicity, once again, to 
the historicist framework of developmentalism. In Bloch’s book, this 
developmentalism, derived from Marx, and existing on the geographically singular 
plane of ‘history’, co-exists in tension with the more complicated idea of ‘a multi-
temporal and multi-spatial dialectic’, which problematizes the spatial ground of 
historical totalization.20 Yet rather that taking up the multi-spatial aspect of this idea, 
Tomba, following the currently dominant reception of the book, turns to Koselleck’s 
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generalization of its temporal component alone. This dates back to Koselleck’s 1973 
essay ‘History, Histories and Formal Structures of Time’, in which the ‘sametimeness 
of the non-sametimed’ – Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen – appears as the 
‘prognostic structure’ of one of the ‘three modes of temporal experience’ that define 
historical experience as such. (Koselleck fails to mention Bloch’s name in this formal 
exposition of the concept – the political abomination to him of Inheritance of This 
Time presumably being too much for him to acknolwedge it.) The geologically 
regulated spatialization of the ‘non-sametimed’ as temporal layers, subsequently set 
out in the 1995 essay ‘Zeitschichten’, is similarly reticient about its source. 
 This is not the occasion for an analysis of either Bloch’s or Koselleck’s 
productive but profoundly problematic texts. Suffice to say, Tomba’s innovation is 
transpose the analysis to the history of capitalism by positing the capitalist market as 
the syncronizing agent, or producer of sametimeness. The ‘layered historiography’ of 
Marx’s pre-history of capitalism is thereby integrated into the global capitalist present 
as a distinct set of temporal relations, in which the conventionally stagist distinction 
between formal and real subsumption to capital is triangulated with Marx’s political 
notion of hybrid subsumption, to produce a structural analysis of historically 
differential forms of subsumption within the present. It is the relations between these 
historically different, or multiple, temporalities that are understood to provide the 
‘political occasion for intervention’. However, having displaced articulation from 
hegemony to market synchronization, there is aporia of the temporal position of the 
political agent here. From within which time(s) does the political agent/subject of 
politics act? 
 This was already a serious problem in Bloch’s account, since, in the absence of 
what he called ‘subjectively sametimely contradictions’ capable of ‘activating’ 
	   11	  
objectively sametimely ones (the classical revolutionary scenario), the proletarian 
hegemonic agent was understood to act only via its re-articulation of (subjectively and 
objectively) non-sametimely contradictions with objectively sametimely ones. 
Whilest these non-sametimely contradictions themeselves were seen to be capable of 
shedding their ‘reactionary’ political character, only is this way. However, this 
scenario abstracts the hegemonic agent itself from historical temporality, making it 
the external ‘master’ of a multiplicity of which it is, in fact, a part. In the post-
Althusserian context of Tomba’s book (theoretically legitimated there somewhat 
awkwardlky via Benjamin), this aporetic externality is ontologized, in the 
identification of political actions as events. The aleatory temporality of the ‘occasion’ 
alone connects structure to event. But the connection is purely formal. Those 
temporalities that are divergent from or conflicting with the process of 
synchronization do not seem capable of forms of political agency that can structurally 
transform that synchronization itself. The temporal aporia is at the same time an 
aporia of the political subject. Acts are considered to take place within particular 
temporalities, and as articulations of different temporalities, but not as being 
productive of their own temporalities, and hence their own new synchronizations. 
 Tomba convincingly places Marx’s writings firmly within the framework of the 
philosophy of time, and he brings to them there certain decisive theoretical 
innovations from the 1930s and the 1960s. These innovations move us closer to being 
able to theorize the temporal complexities of our historical present, but they are 
stopped short by the growing exhaustion as those pasts themselves. 
 
References 
	   12	  
Appaduri, Arjun 2013, ‘How Histories Make Geographies: Circulation and Context in 
 a Global Perspective’, in The Future as Cultural Fact: Essays on the Global 
 Condition, London and New York: Verso, 61–9. 
 
Balibar, Etienne 2014, ‘Foreword: Althusser and the “Ideological State 
 Apparatuses”’, in Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, translated 
 by G. M. Goshgarian, London and New York: Verso, vii–xviii. 
 
Bhabha, Homi, The Location of Culture, London and New York: Routledge, 1994 
 
Bloch, Ernst 1985, Erbschaft dieser Zeit (1935; 1965), Frankfurt-am-main: 
 Suhrkamp, 1985. 
 
----------- 1977 ‘Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to its Dialectics’ (1932), 
 translated by Mark Ritter, New German Critique 11, 22–38.	  
 
----------- 1991, Heritage of Our Times (1935; 1962), translated by Neville and 
 Stephen Plaice, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Durst, David C., 2002, ‘Ernst Bloch’s Theory of Nonsimultaneity’ The Germanic 
 Review: Literature, Culture, Theory, 77: 3, 171–94.  
 
Hall, Stuart 1988, The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left, 
 London and New York: Verso. 
 
Harootunian, Harry 2000, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community 
 in Interwar Japan, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.  
-------------- 2007, ‘Remembering the Historical Present’, Critical Inquiry 33: 3, 471–94. 
 
Jameson, Fredric 1991, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
 London and New York: Verso 
 
Koselleck, Reinhart 1985, ‘History, Histories and Formal Structures of Time’ (1973), 
 in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, translated by Keith Tribe, 
 Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press.j 
 
----------- 2000, ‘Zeitschichten’ (1995), in Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik, 
 Frankfurt-am: Suhrkamp. 
 
----------- 2002, ‘The Unknown Future and the Art of Prognosis’, in The Practice of 
 Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, translated by Todd 
 Samuel Presner etal, Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 131–47.  
 
Osborne, Peter 1995, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, London and New 
 York: Verso. 
 
------------- 2008, ‘Marx and the Philosophy of Time’, Radical Philosophy 47 (Jan/Feb  
 2008) 15–22. 
 
----------- 2009, ‘Occasionalism’, in Matias Faldbakken: Shocked into Abstraction,  
	   13	  
 National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design, Oslo/Ikon Gallery, 
 Birmingham, 44–71. 
 
-----------  2013a, Anywhere Or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art, London 
 and New York: Verso. 
 
----------- 2013b, ‘Global Modernity and the Contemporary: Two Categories of the 
 Philosophy of Historical Time’, in Chris Lorenz and Bevernage, eds, Breaking Up 
 Time: Negotiating the Borders Between the Present, the Past and the Future,  
 Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 69–84. 
 
-----------  2014, ‘The Postconceptual Condition, Or, the Cultural Logic of High Capitalism  
 Today’, Radical Philosophy 184 (March/April 2014), 19–27. 
 
Postone, Moishe 1993, Time, Labour and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s 
 Critical Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schwartz, Frederic J 2001, ‘Ernst Bloch and Wilhelm Pinder: Out of Sync’, Grey 
 Room 3, 54–89. 
 
Tomba, Massilmilliano 2013, Marx’s Temporalities, translated by Peter D. Thomas 
 and Sara R. Ferris, Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
 
Tombazos, Stavros 2014, Time in Marx: The Categories of Time in Marx’s 
 Capital (1994), translated by Christakis Georgiou, Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
 
 
Notes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Postone 1993; Tombazos 2014. 
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  Tomba 2013, 137.	  
5 Tomba 2013, xiii– xiv. 
6 Tomba 2013, 137. 
7 Tombazos 2014. While Tomba relies on Tombazos’s commentary for a large part of 
his framework, no reference is made to Postone’s theoretically more innovative 1993 
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9 Bloch 1991, 114. 
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